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RIGHTS AND REMEDIES OF MEMBERS IN INTERNAL UNION
CONTROVERSIES IN THE SOUTHERN JURISDICTIONS*
There is a traditional reluctance on the part of judges to involve the
courts in the internal affairs of labor unions. Consequently, a judge
will often pause in the course of an opinion adjudicating a union controversy with an aside to the effect that:
Of course, it is well understood that courts are indisposed to interfere
with the internal management of an unincorporated, voluntary association
as is here involved. We have held that the right of a voluntary association
to interpret and administer its own rules and regulations is as sacred as
the right to make them, and there is no presumption against just and
correct action or conduct on the part of its supervising or appelate authorities and tribunals. However .... I

By such statements the courts pay homage to the institutional ancestor
of the present-day labor unions-the clubs and churches which were
governed by the law applicable to voluntary associations. But since
the modern union is neither strictly voluntary nor primarily social,
very often the courts will follow such a disclaimer by directly intervening in the union's internal affairs. 2 The result is a large and apparently growing number of situations in which the courts will intervene. A study of the Southern cases indicates a tendency of the courts
to lag in certain areas of this development (possibly because of the
low volume of cases) to the point that courts will sometimes fail to
give relief to a wronged union member where courts in regions which
have experienced more union litigation would intervene. But in general the authority in the Southern jurisdictions is in line with the prevailing doctrines of internal union intervention.
The cases fall generally into two classes. One group concerns questions of the naked right to belong-i.e., matters of discriminatory exclusion and expulsion from membership. The remedies and procedures
applicable to these situations are relatively well-defined; often the
injured member wants only pecuniary damages, and, if equitable re-

lief is necessary, it can be carried out by a simple order to admit
the wronged party.
* This note was originally prepared as a research paper for the seminar in
Legal Problems of Regional Economic Development at Vanderbilt University
School of Law. The Southern states included in the study are Alabama,
Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Tennessee and Virginia.
1. Local 57, Brotherhood of Painters v. Boyd, 245 Ala. 227, 16 So. 2d 705,

711 (1944). See generally DANGEL & SHRIBER, THE LAW OF LABOR UNIONS
208-11 (1941); WRIGHTINGTON, UNINCORPORATED AssocIATIONs AND BusiNEss
TRUSTS § 58 (2d ed. 1923); Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for

Profit,43 HARv. L. REv. 993 (1930).
2. E.g., Local 57, Brotherhood of Painters v. Boyd, supra, at 713.
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The second group of cases concerns situations where the complaining
parties are secure in their membership, but seek court intervention to
compel the union officials to conduct union business in a certain way.
This obviously raises serious considerations, both of the right of a
voluntary association to be free from judicial intermeddling and of
the wisdom of judicial involvement in sensitive intra-union disputes.
EXCLUSION Am EXPULSION
Legally, there is a basic difference in result between exclusion from
membership and expulsion from a labor union. As voluntary associations, labor unions may refuse to admit any person for any
reason. 3 This is said to be subject to the limitation that a closed union
shall not coincide with a closed shop,4 but a recent Tennessee case,5
upholding the right of a "father and son ' 6 union to exclude outsiders
despite the fact that non-members were obviously being barred from
work, illustrates the reluctance of courts to force admission even in
these situations. However, this freedom may be abridged by statute,
and eighteen states have passed acts forbidding discriminatory exclusions of applicants from union membership.7 While the federal courts
will act to prevent unions from signing collective bargaining agreements which discriminate against excluded workers in the bargaining
unit,8 at present they will not command the union to admit workers
who are in the unit but are denied membership because of their race,
religion or national extraction.9 Since none of the Southern states have
passed fair employment practices acts and federal relief is not available, there is no judicial redress in these states for discriminatory
exclusion from membership.
Contrariwise, once a worker has been admitted to a union, he
acquires membership rights which the courts will protect against
wrongful expulsion. Aside from the fact that he very probably will
3. See DANGEL & SHRIBER, THE LAW OF LABOR UNIONS, op. cit. supra note 1,

at 168-70.

4. See James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P.2d 329 (1944); Sum-

mers, The Right to Join a Union, 47 COLum. L. REv. 33 (1947).
5. Bryan v. International Alliance, 306 S.W.2d 64 (Tenn. App. 1957).
6. Local unions which give first preference in membership to relatives of
existing members are often called "father and son" locals.
7. None of the Southern states have enacted fair employment practices
legislation. For a detailed discussion of the statutes in effect, see 3 RACE REL.
L. REP. 1085 (1958). Query: Assuming a jurisdiction was subject to a statute
which prohibited discrimination on the basis of race, and assuming also that
it followed the attitude of the Bryan case toward "father and son" unions,
could not a union refuse to admit a Negro on the ground that he was not a
son of one of the members?
8. Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
9. Oliphant v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 156 F. Supp. 89
(N.D. Ohio), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 893 (1957), aff'd, 262 F.2d 359 (6th Cir.

1958), cert. denied, 27 U.S. L. Week 3249 (U.S. March 10, 1959). The court
said: 'qn view of the abstract context in which the questions sought to be
raised are presented by this record, the petition for certiorari is denied."
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not be allowed to work without his union status, 10 the member may
lose accrued health, pension, burial, and other benefits as a result of his
expulsion. These losses are always compensable in damages.
Actions for Damages
A member may be legally expelled for violating any of the provisions in the constitution, by-laws or rules of the union for which
expulsion is the punishment, or for conduct which violates the objects
of the union." Workers expelled for other reasons may sue for damages, 12 basing their cause of action on any one or more of several
grounds.
Defamation: If the union wrongfully expels a member and procures
his discharge by communicating the fact of his expulsion to the employer, a cause of action for libel' 3 or slander 4 will lie, on the theory
that the expulsion action is a nullity and the plaintiff is, in truth, still
a member of the union. However, plaintiffs have tended to come to
grief using this theory in the Southern jurisdictions because of the
traditional limitations of a defamation action and the fact that the
damage does not arise from the falsity of words but from the pressures
used to procure the discharge. The artificiality of this theory was
pointed out by an opinion of the Louisiana Supreme Court which required proof of malicious intent by the union officials, although this is
an immaterial element in a true defamation action. 15
Conspiracy:The expelled member may join several individuals in an
action in tort for conspiring to cause his expulsion. 16 This again misses
the point when the bulk of the damages arise from the loss of employment, because the plaintiff must still prove a causal connection
between the conspiracy and the discharge. Also, the conspiracy in
itself is not a true tort, and the plaintiff must still prove a wrongful
act in his expulsion from membership.
Wrongful expulsion: The relation between union and member is one
of contract, based on the provisions of the constitution and by-laws.
When a member has been expelled in violation of these provisions, he
10. The cases indicate this is true in many industries in the Southern states,

despite the fact that all but one of the Southern states (Kentucky) have
"right to work" laws. See note 18 infra.
11. See DANGEL & SHRIBER, THE LAW OF LABOR UNIONS, op. cit. supra note
2, at 194.
12. The general topic of union liability for unlawful expulsion is discussed
in Annot., 62 A.L.R. 315 (1929).

13. E.g., Jones v. Hanson, 220 La. 673, 57 So. 2d 224 (1952).
14. E.g., Dukes v. Brotherhood of Painters, 191 Tenn. 495, 235 S.W.2d 7

(1950), 26 A.L.R.2d 1223 (1952).
15. Jones v. Hanson, note 13 supra. See also
(2d ed. 1955).

PROSSER,

TORTS 593-94, 601-02

16. E.g., Walker v. Grand Int'l Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 186 Ga. 811, 199
S.E. 146 (1938); Edgar v. Southern Ry., 213 S.C. 445, 49 S.E.2d 841 (1948);
Gallop v. Sharp, 179 Va. 335, 19 S.E.2d 84 (1942). See generally 12 VAND. L.

REV. 958 (1959).
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can recover his losses in an action for breach of the contract. If there
is a union-security contract and he loses his job as a result of the
expulsion, he can also recover for lost wages. 17
Procuringbreach of contract: The widespread adoption of "right-towork" statutes in the South 18 has created an anomalous situation with
respect to wages lost as a result of union expulsion. Most of these
statutes are drawn to prohibit "any firm, person, corporation or association of any kind.. ."19 from excluding a worker from employment for
non-membership in a union. Although the wording might bear a
broader interpretation, it is construed to give no right of action against
the offending union.20 The new Louisiana statute specifically provides
a civil remedy for violation of the act, and adds "labor organization"
to the list, apparently avoiding the result obtained in the other jurisdictions.2 ' The existence of these statutes can make it more difficult
for the worker to recover from the union for his loss of wages, since
it declares that he shall not lose his employment as a result of union
expulsion. Thus, he cannot allege simply expulsion resulting from
breach of contract, with consequent loss of employment under a union
security agreement between the union and employer. The Tennessee
Supreme Court was faced with this problem in Dukes v. Brotherhood
of Painters,2 where the plaintiff based his suit on a slander theory but
failed to allege either words slanderous per se or special damages. The
court held that the gravamen of the action was the tort of procuring
the discharge of another, so that the union plaintiff was liable to the
lost wages, despite the fact that the employer could have discharged
him at any time without liability.
These theories of recovery apply equally to actions at law for damages,2 and as incidental relief in proceedings for mandamus,2 4 re17. E.g., Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Green, 210 Ala. 496, 98 So. 569
(1923); Walker v. Grand Intl Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, supra; Schneider v.
Local 60, United Ass'n of Journeymen Plumbers, 116 La. 270, 40 So. 700 (1906).
18. ALA. CODS AiN. tit. 26, §§ 375(1)-(7) (Supp. 1958); ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 81, 202 (1947); FLA. CONST. DEcL. OF Ri Hs, § 12 (Supp. 1958); GA. CODE Am.
§§ 54-901 to -908 (Supp. 1958); MIss. CODE ANN. § 6984.5 (Supp. 1958); N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 95-78 to -84 (Repl. 1958); S.C. CODE § 40-46 to -46.11 (Supp.
1958); TENN. CODE ANN.§§ 50-210 to -212 (1956); VA. CODE ANN.§§ 40-68 to
-74 (Repl. 1953). The Louisiana statute covers only agricultural workers.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23:881-89 (Supp. 1958). See generally, Powell, The
Right to Work Laws, 15 FED. B.J. 54 (1955); Woll, State Anti-Union Security
Laws-A Tragic Fraud,15 FED. B.J. 68 (1955).
19. TENN. CODEANN.§ 50-210 (1956).
20. E.g., Dukes v. Brotherhood of Painters, 191 Tenn. 495, 235 S.W.2d 7
(1950), 26 A.L.R.2d 1223 (1952).
21. LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 23:886 (Supp. 1958).
22. See note 20 supra. See also Annot., 26 A.L.R.2d 1227 (1952); Evans v.
Swaim, 245 Ala. 641, 18 So. 2d 400 (1944).
23. E.g., Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Green, 210 Ala. 496, 98 So.
569 (1923); Walker v. Grand Int'l Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 186 Ga. 811,
199 S.E. 146 (1938); Edgar v. Southern Ry., 213 S.C. 445, 49 S.E.2d 841 (1948);
Gallop v. Sharp, 179 Va. 335, 19 S.E.2d 84 (1942).
24. E.g., Monroe v. Colored Screwmen's Benev. Ass'n, 135 La. 893, 66 So.
260 (1914).
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ceivership,25 or injunction. 26 Upon the theory that the plaintiff should
be put in the same position as that in which he would have been had
he not been excluded from membership, he may recover for the loss of
membership privileges as well as lost wages. 27 As a general rule the
plaintiff must attempt to mitigate damages,2 8 and deductions will be
made for dues that would have been paid during the expulsion period. 29
Membership losses include participation in higher earnings resulting
from collective activity,30 cancelled insurance policies, and other accrued benefits.31 In proper cases the plaintiff may be awarded punitive
34
damages, 32 compensation for mental anguish,3 and attorney fees.
Granted that well-settled grounds for recovery exist, there remain
isolated procedural and theoretical defenses which may apply to bar
recovery in these cases. A particularly objectionable one originates
from the common law concept that unincorporated associations are
legal nonenties and therefore cannot sue or be sued in the civil courts.
There appears to be no practical reason for continuing to apply the
rule, and Alabama, Florida, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee
and Virginia have abolished it by statute.35 The Kentucky courts
reluctantly applied the rule for years before finally abolishing it in
1948 by judicial fiat.36 Arkansas, Georgia, Mississippi and Louisiana
still follow the old rule.37 When specific relief is required this situation
25. E.g., Nyland v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 156 La. 604, 100 So. 733
(1924).
26. E.g., Local 57, Bhd. of Painters v. Boyd, 245 Ala. 227, 16 So.2d 705
(1944); Bonham v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 146 Ark. 117, 225
S.W. 335 (1920); Edrington v. Hall, 168 Ga. 565, 148 S.E. 403 (1929); Schneider
v. Local 60, United Ass'n of Journeymen Plumbers, 116 La. 270, 40 So. 700
(1906).
27. Some of the cases indicate that expelled members are undershooting by
suing only for actual wages lost to the time of the suit. By analogy to the
cases of employees suing for breach of contract of employment where the
trial precedes the expiration of the term, the worker should be compensated
for probable loss of future wages. 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 1361-62 (rev.
ed. 1937).
28. E.g., Malloy v. Carroll, 287 Mass. 376, 191 N.E. 661 (1934). But see
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Barnhill, 214 Ala. 565, 108 So. 456 (1926)
(when suing for promised strike benefits, plaintiff did not have to allege an
attempt to find work to mitigate damages, since he had a vested right in the
strike fund).
29. E.g., Malloy v. Carroll, supra.
30. E.g., Edrington v. Hall, 168 Ga. 565, 148 S.E. 403 (1929).
31. E.g., Walker v. Grand Int'l Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 186 Ga. 811,
199 S.E. 146 (1938).
32. E.g., Local 57, Bhd. of Painters v. Boyd, 245 Ala. 227, 16 So.2d 705 (1944);
Walker v. Grand Int'l Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, supra; Schneider Local 60,
United Ass'n of Journeymen Plumbers, 116 La. 270, 40 So. 700 (1906).
33. E.g., Malloy v. Carroll, 287 Mass. 376, 191 N.E. 661 (1934).
34. Ibid; Walker v. Grand Int'l Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, supra note 31.
35. AL.A. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 142 (1940); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 447.11 (1952);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-69.1 (Supp. 1957); S.C. CODE § 10-429 (1952); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 20-223 (1956); VA. CODE ANN. § 40-74.4 (Supp. 1958).
36. Jackson v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 307 Ky. 485, 211
S.W.2d 138 (1948) (officers represent the union under the class suit theory).
37. Baskins v. United Mine Workers, 150 Ark. 398, 234 S.W. 464 (1921);
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is relatively unimportant, since the individual officers can be ordered
to do or cease from doing the proscribed activity. But it is an inexcusable disadvantage to the worker whose injury resulted from the
power of the union as an entity, but must rely on the assets of the
38
individual wrongdoers for relief.

Another defense frequently raised is that the plaintiff has not
exhausted administrative remedies available within the union organization. While this is always a pertinent defense to an equitable action,
most courts hold that it should not be a prerequisite to a suit for
damages. 39 Many of the cases which require exhaustion of internal
remedies fail to distinguish between damage suits and equitable intervention, and sometimes internal exhaustion is required because damages would necessitate a receivership or other equitable relief. 0 The
most convincing argument for court relief (when the claim is for
damages alone) is that the unions do not provide an internal remedy
41
to exhaust.
Actions for Reinstatement
A suit for reinstatement is in effect a plea for court review of the
union's action of expulsion. Generally speaking, a court may interfere
if (a) the conduct for which the member was expelled was not, or for
policy reasons cannot be, a punishable offense by the union laws; or
Spence v. The Woodman Co., 213 Ga. 573, 100 S.E.2d 435 (1957); Varnado v.
Whitney, 166 Miss. 663, 147 So. 479 (1933). In Louisiana a union can be
sued only for debts incurred for the benefit of the association. LA. CIV. CODE
ANN.art. 446 (1952), LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13.3471(22) (1950); State ex rel.
Doone v. General Longshore Workers, 61 So. 2d 747 (La. App. 1952).
38. Professor Chafee reasoned that the association should not have to pay
damages for wrongful expulsion, since the members who voted against expulsion would thereby be punished with the guilty parties. Chafee, The
Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43 HARV. L. REV. 993 (1930).
However, Professor Chafee dealt with associations as if they were a homogeneous group of institutions, without distinguishing the peculiar problems of
labor unions, and he seemed to be thinking of "associations" in the sense of
clubs and churches. Actually, a distinct body of law applicable to labor unions
seems to be developing, evidenced by the large amount of literature on the
subject, and the fact that the courts cite largely labor union cases and resort
to other association authority only when there are no established labor union
precedents.
39. Compare Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Green, 210 Ala. 496, 98
So. 569 (1923); Bonham v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 146 Ark. 117,
225 S.W. 335 (1920); and Walker v. Grand Int'l Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs,
supra note 31 (no exhaustion of remedies required), with Nyland v. United
Bhd. of Carpenters, 156 La. 604, 100 So. 733 (1924) (plaintiff must exhaust
internal remedies). The requirement for exhaustion of internal remedies is
discussed in detail at pp. 895-96 infra.
40. E.g., Nyland v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, supra, where the plaintiff
requested a receiver to take over the union's assets.
41. See Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Green, supra note 23, at 572.
Cf. Wilson v. Miller, 194 Tenn. 390, 250 S.W.2d 575 (1952) (plaintiff sought
accounting, court excused his failure to resort to ineffectual internal audit
procedure).
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(b) if the proceeding was so defective as to render the tribunal's
decision void.4
The case of Schneider v. Local 60, United Ass'n of Journeymen
Plumbers43 is a leading case for the first proposition. The plaintiffs
had been expelled in a proper proceeding for resisting the union's
efforts to control their votes as members of the city plumbing board.
The court granted a decree of reinstatement on the grounds that the
union's disciplinary power extends only to lawful orders and the
plaintiffs were justified in disobeying. More difficult cases arise when
the workers' conduct is not so clearly outside the pale of legitimate
44
union control. Typical of this situation was Edrington v. Hall, where

the Georgia Supreme Court considered the propriety of the common
union rule which prohibits criticism of the organization's leaders, and
held for the member on the ground that the union cannot arbitrarily
restrict his freedom of speech. In similar situations the Arkansas 45
and Louisiana4 6 courts have held that unions may legally expel members for this offense.
If the plaintiff alleges a defect in the expulsion action, he must
show that his conduct was not against the union's rules; or that the
expulsion procedure violated the union's constitution or by-laws; or
that the procedure, while technically proper, did not afford him a
fair hearing. The courts are not picayune about requiring procedural
niceties, as has been indicated by the Alabama Supreme Court:
The constitution, laws, and regulations of such associations are in the
nature of a contract between it and its members, and they, as well as
the association, are bound thereby; and the expulsion of a member, if
for cause within the jurisdiction of the tribunal of the association by
which it is pronounced, after notice and opportunity to be heard and a
trial conducted in accordance with the constitution, laws and regulations
of the association, is conclusive upon the civil courts. But, as we have
previously observed, the courts are largely in accord that such associations must act in good faith.47
42. See Annot., 21 A.L.R.2d 1397 (1952). See generally Chamberlin, The
Judicial Process in Labor Unions, 10 BROoKLYN L. REV. 145 (1940); Cox, The
Role of Law in Preserving Union Democracy, 72 HARV. L. REV. 609, 613-20
(1959); Kovner, The Legal Protection of Civil Liberties Within Unions, 1948
Wis. L. REV. 18; Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair Representation: Federal Responsibility in a Federal System, 67 YALE L. REV. 1327 (1958); Comment, 45 YALE L.J. 1248 (1936).

43. 116 La. 270, 40 So. 700 (1906).
44. 168 Ga. 565, 148 S.E. 403 (1929). Cf. Underwood v. Maloney, 14 F.R.D.
222 (E.D. Pa. 1953) (member granted equitable relief despite initiation contract not to sue union).
45. Love v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 139 Ark. 375, 215 S.W. 602
(1919).
46. Elfer v. Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n, 179 La. 383, 154 So. 32 (1934).
47. Local 57, Bhd. of Painters v. Boyd, 245 Ala. 227, 16 So. 2d 705, 711 (1944).
Cf. Jetton-Dekle Lumber Co. v. Mather, 53 Fla. 969, 43 So. 590 (1907) (court
enjoined union from intimidating non-union painters, but refused to enjoin
it from expelling members who worked with non-union men).
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In the final analysis, the element of good faith is the decisive factor
in most of the cases. Although it is often said that "a court will not
review the case on its merits though it may review the form of the
proceedings... ."48 The fact is that the courts must review the merits
to the extent necessary to determine good faith, and, since there is
no written record of the union proceeding, the parties often get a trial
49
de novo before the courts.
The element of good faith has also become the determining factor
in what was once a formal prerequisite to specific relief-the requirement that the member exhaust all administrative remedies within
the union before resorting to the courts. In theory this requirement
was calculated to give the union an opportunity to correct its own
mistakes, and to ease the burden on the courts, but in practice the
unrealistic procedures offered by the unions were the source of much
hardship. Typically the union requires the member to appeal the
local's action to the international president or executive board, and
then make a final appeal to the international union's convention.5 0
This involves a long delay without work for the expelled member, and
often the appellate bodies are controlled by the faction which caused
the member's expulsion.51
As a result the courts have developed a series of exceptions which
have all but eliminated the rule. Thus, if the appeal would be futile52
or would cause oppressive delay,53 or if the union's action was outside
its jurisdiction,54 the ousted member may go to court, even in violation of an express agreement to exhaust internal remedies. 55 Professor
Summers points out that this approach allows courts to justify inter48. DANGEL & SHRIBER, THE LAW OF
MCCLINTOCK, EQUITY § 161 (2d ed. 1948).

LABOR

UNIONS

211 (1941).

Accord,

49. E.g., Holmes v. Brown, 146 Ga. 402, 91 S.E. 408 (1917); State ex Tel.
Curtis v. Stevedore's and Longshoreman's Benev. Ass'n, 43 La. Ann. 1098,
10 So. 169 (1891). Compare Wilson v. Miller, 194 Tenn. 390, 250 S.W.2d 575
(1952), with Liming v. Maloney, 32 Tenn. App. 632, 225 S.W.2d 276 (1949).
50. See Chamberlain, The Judicial Process in Labor Unions, 10 BROOKLYN

L. REV. 145, 153-56 (1940).
51. The United Auto Workers union has adopted a novel system of internal
appeals in an attempt to correct these weaknesses. The plan provides for (a)
the selection of the local union trial committees by lottery rather than by
election, and (b) a Public Review Board of outstanding citizens, which gives
the members an external appellate tribunal and avoids the delays inherent
in the convention system. See External Review of Union Internal Actions,
CHAMBERLAIN, SOURCEBOOK ON LABOR 208 (1958).
52. E.g., Wilson v. Miller, 194 Tenn. 390, 250 S.W.2d 575 (1952).
53. E.g., Local 4, Nat'l Organization of Masters v. Brown, 258 Ala. 18, 61
So. 2d 93 (1952) (delay of two years); Local 57, Bhd. of Painters v. Boyd,
245 Ala. 227, 16 So. 2d 705 (1944) (delay of two months).
54. E.g., Edrington v. Hall, 168 Ga. 565, 148 S.E. 403 (1929)

(plaintiffs al-

leged the union was "acting without its scope"); State ex rel. Willis v.
General Longshore Workers, 202 La. 277, 11 So. 2d 589 (1942) (plaintiff was
expelled without a trial, court held there were no proceedings for the
internal tribunals to review).
55. See Note, 1954 WASH. U.L.Q. 440, 441-47.
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vention "in all cases where the union has acted wrongfully," and reports that out of more than two hundred New York cases, only twenty
were dismissed for failure to exhaust remedies. 56 The Southern jurisdictions have not been so liberal. Out of twenty-nine cases found
involving pleas for specific internal intervention, seven were dismissed for failure to comply with this requirement. A close analysis
of these cases indicates that the courts require detailed allegations of
specific union abuses, and not mere accusations of wrongful or fraudulent conduct. 57 In only one case did the court persist in the exhaustion
requirement in the face of detailed allegations of arbitrary actions by
the union leadership.5 On the other hand, the courts apply the other
side of the good faith coin and require the member to exhaust his
remedies in lieu of bad faith, even if the expulsion procedure was
59
irregular and the result harsh.
Usually the specific relief sought is an injunction in equity. Experience has shown that a plea for reinstatement invariably fulfills the
prerequisites for equitable jurisdiction, since the expelled member
can always show that his injury is irreparable and his legal remedy
inadequate. As for the requirement that a property interest be involved, the plaintiff need only recite the loss of some membership
61
benefit.6° Thus, the courts have held union insurance benefits, burial
63
62
and pension benefits, seniority rights, participation in higher wages
65
64
procured through collective bargaining, and the right to work to
be property rights justifying equitable intervention.
If the union is incorporated the plaintiff may obtain specific relief
56. Summers, Judicial Settlement of Internal Union Disputes, 7 BUFFALO L.

REV. 405, 410 (1958).

57. Stanton v. Harris, 152 Fla. 736, 13 So. 2d 17 (1943); Nyland v. United
Bhd. of Carpenters, 156 La. 604, 100 So. 733 (1924).
58. Elfer v. Marine Engineers Beneficial Ass'n, 179 La. 383, 154 So. 32 (1934).
59. Bonham v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 146 Ark. 117, 225 S.W.
335 (1920) (member expelled for committing adultery with his brother's wife
was not allowed to testify at union hearing); Bradford v. Grand Int'l Bhd. of
Locomotive Eng'rs, 188 La. 819, 178 So. 362 (1937) (international union was
in good faith but used irregular procedure in reversing convention decision
favorable to plaintiff); Bryan v. International Alliance, 306 S.W.2d 64 (Tenn.
App. 1957) (plaintiffs had been informally notified by international officer
that their appeal would be denied).
60. One study disclosed only five recorded cases in which the requisite
property rights were not found by the courts. Summers, Legal Limitations on
Union Discipline, 64 HARv. L. REv. 1049, 1052 n.11 (1951).
61. E.g., Edrington v. Hall, 168 Ga. 565, 148 S.E. 403 (1929); Bonham v.
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 146 Ark. 117, 225 S.W. 335 (1920).
62. E.g., Holmes v. Brown, 146 Ga. 402, 91 S.E. 408 (1917); Elfer v. Marine
Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n, 179 La. 383, 154 So. 32 (1943).
63. E.g., Gregg v. Starks, 188 Ky. 834, 224 S.W. 459 (1920). Contra, Shaup
v. Grand Int'l Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 223 Ala. 202, 135 So. 327 (1931).
64. E.g., Edrington v. Hall, 168 Ga. 565, 148 S.E. 403 (1929).
65. E.g., Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908); Local 4, Nat'l Organization of Masters v. Brown, 258 Ala. 18, 61 So. 2d 93 (1952).
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by a writ of mandamus,66 but the existence of this remedy does not
preclude equitable relief.67 Mandamus is not a proper remedy when
the union is unincorporated. 68 Certiorari is not available because the
decision of a union tribunal cannot be treated as a judgment of a legal
tribunal. 69
COURT REGULATION OF INTERNAL MATTERS

If the complaining party is secure in his membership but seeks
court intervention to force union officials to conduct the organization's
affairs in a certain way, he is in an entirely different position from
the expelled member seeking reinstatement. Since the worker's job
is not at stake, his controversy with the union leadership takes on
more of the aspects of an intrachurch or club wrangle. Also, these
internal matters tend to be much more complicated than expulsion
cases, and the courts must consider the correspondingly reduced
effectiveness of their intervention and the wisdom of involving the
courts in sensitive intra-union controversies.
The Southern cases bear out the increased reluctance of the courts
to intervene in non-expulsion situations. 0 Even in actions for damages they are much less likely to give a judgment for the member.
Here the courts are faced with impressive theoretic difficulties inherent in the member-association relationship. For instance, is not
the member in a situation analogous to that of the partner suing the
partnership, thereby suing himself? The courts have not been so
doctrinaire.7 '
They have responded, however, to the argument that the membership contract requires the surrender of certain rights-even property
rights-to the group. Thus, in Brotherhood of Raiload Trainmen v.
WilliamS7 2 the plaintiffs, former members of a local which had had its
charter revoked for an illegal strike, were thwarted in their attempt
66. E.g., Medical & Surgical Soc. v. Weatherly, 75 Ala. 248 (1883); State
ex tel. Curtis v. Stevedore's & Longshoreman's Benev. Ass'n, 43 La. Ann. 1098,
10 So. 169 (1891).
67. E.g., Local 57, Bhd. of Painters v. Boyd, 245 Ala. 227, 16 So. 2d 705
(1944) (mandamus considered an inadequate remedy at law for purposes of
establishing equity jurisdiction because it was "too slow").
68. E.g., Francis v. Scott, 260 Ala. 595, 72 So. 2d 98 (1954); Holmes v.
Brown, 146 Ga. 402, 91 S.E. 408 (1917).
69. Pratt v. Rudisule, 249 App. Div. 305, 292 N.Y. Supp. 68 (1936).
70. COURT DECISIONS ON INTERNAL UNION CONTROVERSIES IN THE SOUTIERN
JURISDICTIONS

Expulsion

Damages

Specific Relief
Internal Affairs

Damages

member

5
3

1

union

3
5

3

Specific Relief
4
17
71. Grand Int'l Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Couch, 236 Ala. 611, 184 So.
173 (1938); Varnado v. Whitney, 166 Miss. 663, 147 So. 479 (1933).
72. 211 Ky. 638, 277 S.W. 500 (1952).
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to recover purely local funds which had been taken over by the international union. The court held that
such societies may, by the adoption of a constitution or other general
rules, determine finally the property rights and interests of a member or
of a subordinate lodge .... 73
The Alabama Supreme Court reasoned likewise when a member sued
for accrued strike benefits promised in his initiation contract.7 4 However, if the union is guilty of bad faith, the courts will act to protect
even less substantial property rights, as did the Louisiana Supreme
damages for salary lost as a reCourt when it awarded a union officer
75
hearing.
a
without
removal
sult of his
When the plaintiff asks for specific relief his chances are even less
promising. In internal matters the union's discretion seems to be
unlimited, as long as it is exercised in good faith. Thus, a Kentucky
court recently upheld a union in its refusal to arbitrate the individual
rights of an employee.7 6 Without considering the merits of the particular worker's grievance, the court held that the union's discretion
was limited only by its duty to act fairly and without hostile discrimination among the employees. 77 Much litigation has centered around
the authority of a union to change seniority policies and thus retroactively affect the seniority positions of the workers. Here the courts
are almost unanimous in holding that seniority rights are not vested
contractual or property rights justifying the court's intervention, and
therefore the union can modify these rights at any time, as long as it
is not guilty of fraud or bad faith.7 8 Likewise, the courts will not act
to prevent a union from disciplining its members under its rules,79 nor
73. Id. at 503.
74. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Barnhill, 214 Ala. 565, 108 So. 456
(1926). Cf. Bryan v. International Alliance, 306 S.W.2d 64 (Tenn. App. 1957).
75. State ex rel. Willis v. General Longshore Workers, 202 La. 277, 11 So. 2d
589 (1942).
76. Renzi v. Oertel Brewing Co., 36 CCH LAB. CAs. ff 65,118 (Jefferson, Ky.

Cir. Ct. C.A. 1958).
77. Cf. Grand Int'l Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Couch, 236 Ala. 611, 184
So. 173 (1938) (union did not abuse its discretion in refusing to press the
grievance of an employee fired for insulting female railroad passengers).
78. Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R., 245 Ala. 113, 16 So. 2d 416 (1944); Shaup
v. Grand Int'l Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 223 Ala. 202, 135 So. 327 (1931);
Louisville & N. R.R. v. Bryant, 263 Ky. 578, 92 S.W.2d 749 (1936); Cannon v.
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 262 Ky. 113, 89 S.W.2d 620 (1935); Aulich
v. Craigmyle, 248 Ky. 676, 59 S.W.2d 560 (1933); McGregor v. Louisville &
N. R.R., 244 Ky. 696, 51 S.W.2d 953 (1932); Haynes v. United Chemical Workers, CIO, 190 Tenn. 165, 228 S.W.2d 101 (1950); McClure v. Louisville & N.
R.R., 16 Tenn. App. 369, 64 S.W.2d 538 (1933). Contra, Piercy v. Louisville
& N. R.R., 198 Ky. 477, 248 S.W. 1042 (1923), 33 A.L.R. 322 (1924). See gen-

erally Christenson, Seniority Rights Under Labor Union Working Agreements,
11 TmvELPr L.Q. 355 (1937); Annot., 142 A.L.R. 1055 (1942).
79. Miami Federation of Musicians v. Wompearce, Inc., 76 So. 2d 298 (Fla.
1954); Harper v. Hoecherl, 153 Fla. 29, 14 So. 2d 179 (1943); Jetton-Dekle
Lumber Co. v. Mather, 53 Fla. 969, 43 So. 590 (1907).
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will they enjoin union action merely on the allegation that it is irregular or not clearly authorized by the constitution or bylaws.80
Although there are few reported cases in which Southern courts
have intervened in purely internal matters, all the jurisdictions acknowledge the power to interfere, and they have not been timid when
exercising this power. Thus, in Wilson v. Miller,81 the Tennessee

Supreme Court joined the ranks of the few courts that have authorized court-supervised union elections. A rank-and-file member of
the operating engineers alleged that the officers of a Memphis local
were systematically robbing the treasury, holding crooked elections

and terrorizing the members. The court waived the necessity for
exhausting internal remedies, authorized an accounting, and ordered
the election. Also, in two recent cases the Alabama Supreme Court
has upheld intervention in internal union matters. In Local 4,
Nat'l Organization of Masters v. Brown8 it abolished a union hiring
hall system which was clearly inconsistent with the union's agreement
with the employer. In Francis v. Scott8 3 the court held that the
Journeymen Barbers International union had acted in violation of
its constitution in revoking the charter of a local union and attempting to dictate pricing policies, and ordered the international to return
all rights of membership to the local.
The most extreme form of judicial intervention into union affairs is
the receivership device, whereby the court appoints a receiver to take
over the assets of the union and manage its affairs until the internal
organization is purged of corrupt influences. Such drastic relief is
never granted unless there is imminent danger of irreparable injury
to the members which could not be dealt with by less extreme
measures.8 Although the relief granted in Wilson v. Miller was almost tantamount to a receivership, there have been no reported cases
in the Southern jurisdictions in which a receivership was decreed in
an internal dispute.85 In Nyland v. United Bhd. of Carpenters86 the
Louisiana Supreme Court denied a request for a receiver on the
grounds that the plaintiff had not exhausted his internal remedies.
The rationale of the case seems erroneous, since the prevailing view
is that a delay in such an emergency situation would be in effect a
80. Bradford v. Grand Int'l Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, note 59 supra; Local
76, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 143 La. 901, 79
So. 532 (1918) (international union acted under authority of ambiguous
constitutional provision).
81. 194 Tenn. 390, 250 S.W.2d 575 (1952).
82. 258 Ala. 18, 61 So. 2d 93 (1952).

83. 260 Ala. 595, 72 So. 2d 98 (1954).
84. See Robinson v. Nick, 235 Mo. App. 461, 136 S.W.2d 374 (1940).
85. But cf. District 21, United Mine Workers v. Bourland, 169 Ark. 796, 277
S.W. 546 (1925) (court appeared to accept theory of receivership but denied
relief because unincorporated association could not be a party).
86. 156 La. 604, 100 So. 733 (1924).
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denial of any remedy. 87 But the probable reason for the decision
was that the plaintiff alleged merely general mismanagement, and
failed to state such specific serious grounds to justify a receivership.
STATE STATUTORY REGULATION

Two Southern states, Alabama and Florida, have statutes on the
books which purport to regulate some of the internal affairs of labor
unions.88 However, a close study of these laws indicates that they
were motivated more by the desire to obstruct unionism than to
regulate it for the protection of the members, and they have been
singularly ineffective in practice.
The Alabama statute 89 requires local unions to file copies of their
constitutions and by-laws, and requires detailed annual financial
reports to be submitted to the Department of Labor and the membership. The penalty for violation is a maximum fine of one thousand
dollars. The weakness of the act is that there is no machinery to
insure that copies of the financial statement are actually distributed
to the members, where it might be of some value, and the state officials have no way of knowing whether or not it is being complied
with. There have been no prosecutions for violations of this statute. 90
Florida has enacted a rather confusing assortment of regulatory
provisions,91 some of which appear to be geared toward obstructing
union organization efforts, while others are calculated to protect
members' rights. One section requires all unions to comply with
certain registration formalities, and requires the licensing of all business agents. In addition, any prospective business agent must convince a licensing board that he is a citizen of the United States and
a resident for more than ten years, that he has not been convicted of
a felony, and that he is a person of good moral character. In Hill v.
Florida92 the United States Supreme Court held these provisions in
conflict with the full freedom of choice guaranteed to workers by the
National Labor Relations Act, and invalid to the extent that they
prevent the union and the business agent from functioning as such
87. MATHEWS, LABOR RELATIONS AND THE LAw 932 (1953). See also Cosentino
v. Goldman, 183 Misc. 539, 49 N.Y.S.2d 467 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
88. For a comparison of the various state statutes, see Aaron & Komaroff,
Statutory Regulation of Internal Union Affairs, 44 ILL. L. REV. 425, 451-62
(1949).

89. AIA. CODE ANN. tit. 26, § 382 (Cum. Supp. 1955).

90. Letter from Olin B. Brooks, Director of Labor of the State of Alabama,
to the Vanderbilt Law Review, Feb. 13, 1959.
91. FLA. STAT. ANN.§§ 447.01-.15 (1952).

92. 325 U.S. 538 (1945). Section 305 of the Kennedy bill before the 86th
Congress is based on essentially the same theory as the Florida provision. It

bars persons from holding union office who have been convicted of committing
certain specified crimes, or who have failed to file the reports required by the
bill. S. 505, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
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without compliance. Apparently both the Alabama and Florida
statutes are valid in merely requiring the filing of information, and
presumably Florida may still apply its full sanction to unions in
intra-state enterprises which are not covered by the NLRA.
Since Alabama and Florida passed their statutes in 1943 the TaftHartley Act has imposed similar filing requirements on all unions
subject to the NLRA. 93 Thus, each union must file with the Secretary
of Labor copies of its constitution and by-laws, and a description of
its internal organization and procedures. The unions must submit
annual reports to the Secretary of Labor and to the members showing
the source and amount of all receipts, total assets and liabilities, and
the amount and purpose of all disbursements during the year. In
practice, however, the unions have been able to get by with only
vague disclosures of their financial transactions, and it is felt that
the requirements have not had the desired effect of raising union
accounting standards.9 4
The Florida statute includes three other provisions apparently calculated to protect rank-and-file workers' rights. Section 447.05 specifies that no initiation fee shall be in excess of fifteen dollars. Section
447.07 requires all unions to keep detailed financial records, and
provides that members shall be allowed to inspect these records at
all reasonable times. Section 447.09 attempts to preserve members'
civil liberties by making it unlawful for any person:
(1) To interfere with or prevent the right of franchise of any member
of a labor organization. The right of franchise shall include the right
of an employee to make complaint, file charges, give information or testimony concerning the violations of this chapter, or the petitioning to his
union regarding any grievance he may have concerning his membership
or employment, or the making known facts concerning such grievance or
violations of law to any public officials, and his right of free petition,
lawful assemblage and free speech.
The act requires that the elections be by secret ballot.9 5 There are
no reported cases of prosecutions under any of these provisions, and
it is obvious that they have added no significant rights for the protection of labor union members in any event, a study of existing and
proposed federal legislation indicates that state legislation in these
areas will soon be superseded or outmoded by federal law.
93. 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(f)-(h) (1952).
94. See Taft, Internal Affairs of Unions and the Taft-Hartley Act, 11

IND.

& LAB. REL. REv. 352, 355-57 (1958).
95. Opponents of secret ballot requirements often point out that, while
corrupt leaders can intimidate members in open elections, they can. also
juggle the results of unsupervised secret balloting. See Cox, The Role of
Law in Preserving Union Democracy, 72 HARv. L. Rsv. 609, 628-29 (1959).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 12

EFFECT OF FEDERAL LEGISLATION

Until recently the shadow of federal pre-emption under the Labor
Management Relations Act clouded the law of union membership
rights. Since section 8(b) (2) 9 of the LMIRA protects the worker who
is denied admission to or expelled from a union, to the extent of
barring the union from interfering with his employment, many expulsions are tantamount to unfair labor practices. But in 1958 the United
States Supreme Court declared in International Ass'n of Machinists
v. Gonzales97 that, although the union's conduct may involve an
unfair labor practice and potential NLRB action, a state court may
award both damages and a reinstatement decree. The Court reasoned
that a contract action for wrongful expulsion-since it carries a possibility of damages for mental and physical suffering-is a more comprehensive remedy than the reimbursement for lost wages possible
under a NLRB decree. Therefore, the possibility of obtaining partial
relief from the NLRB does not deprive the party of available state
remedies for all damages suffered. 98
The enactment of proposed federal legislation will almost certainly
raise new pre-emption issues. However, it appears that the Gonzales
case will not be disturbed, since none of the proposed acts include
any provisions relating to exclusion or expulsion from membership.
This area of litigation will remain primarily in state hands. Rather,
the more noticeable impact of the new legislation will be in the area
of internal union elections and trusteeships.
Both the Kennedy bill 99 and the Administration bill'1 o require that
internal union elections be by secret ballot, with various other safeguards specified. The Kennedy bill provides that a member may,
after he has exhausted his internal remedies, 101 initiate proceedings
through the Secretary of Labor to have the election declared invalid
and a new election conducted. Section 303 makes exclusive the election remedies provided by the bill. The Administration bill, on the
other hand, specifies that any violation of its election regulations
which is not the subject of pending action by the Secretary of Labor
may be the subject of an action in any court of competent jurisdic96. "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents . . . (2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate
against an employee... with respect to whom membership in such organization has been denied or terminated on some ground other than his failure to
tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees formerly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership," 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b) (2) (1952).

97. 356 U.S. 617, 12 VAND. L. REv. 287 (1958).
98. Id. at 620-23.
99. S. 505, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 301 (1959).

100. S. 748, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 302 (1959).

101. This requirement is dispensed with if the union has not reached a final

decision within four months. Section 302.
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tion.10 2 Thus the union members may enforce their rights created by
the federal act through the speedy processes of the state courts, including the ability of the state courts to issue injunctions before a
fraudulent election is held. It appears that the need for consistency
would not be sufficient to justify pre-emption here, as long as inconsistencies in the state procedures do not undermine the federal
program. Contrariwise, the pre-emption clause of the Kennedy bill
might eliminate valuable state remedies and create a "no man's land"
10 3
where no relief would be available.
Both bills set up machinery for regulating trusteeships imposed on
local unions, and both specify that existing remedies shall not be
superseded. However, the non-statutory remedies available in state
courts have proved to be awkward and largely ineffectual, and have
been rarely used, 04 so these new rights will provide welcome added
protection to the members. Both bills attempt to tighten up the filing
requirements for financial reports, provide machinery to assure that
members are given copies, and provide that the information may
be published as public information. 05
CONCLUSION

It is not surprising that the federal government is moving vigorously into the areas of internal union regulation in which the states
have failed to develop effective remedies. However, there remains a
vital role for the states to play in providing forums for the largest
single class of cases-the expulsion controversies. The preceding
review of the case law of the Southern jurisdictions indicates that
the courts provide an expelled union member with adequate remedies
at law and equity, consistent with the basic right of a union to be
free from judicial interference in its good faith dealings with its
members. As for the states with antiquated procedural methods, the
most onerous objections could be removed by two acts of statutory
streamlining:
(1) All the states should provide that unions may sue or be sued.
(2) The exhaustion of remedies muddle could be clarified by abandoning the system of ad hoc exceptions in favor of a stated period
during which the union must provide internal review or surrender
the controversy to the jurisdiction of the courts.10
102. S. 748, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 302(a) (1959).
103. See Summers, The Role of Legislation in Internal Union Affairs, 10

LAB. L.J. 115, 161 (1959).

104. See Cox, The Role of Law in Preserving Union Democracy, 72

REV. 609, 638-41 (1959).

HARV. L.

105. S. 505, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 104 (1959), S. 748, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 209 (1959).
106. The Senate version of the Kennedy bill, passed since the text of this
note was written, incorporated this principle into its "Bill of Rights of Mem-

